This paper presents a non-cooperative model of intra-household decision-making regarding investment in migration. It is shown that the combination of liquidity constraints and imperfect commitment are a source of underinvestment in migration. More precisely, we highlight that, if remittances are unenforceable as a repayment for parent's contribution in migration transaction costs, then both migrant and parent's liquidity constraints, rather than household's liquidity constraint as a whole, matter in determining the investment decision. Besides, the insurance motive for remittances is shown to generate divergence of interest over the characteristics of migration. This result calls for a theoretical approach that properly takes account of potential internalization problems, which the paper intends to o¤er. Plausibility checks of the model are provided by comparative statics whose outcomes are consistent with previous research on migration and remittances.
Introduction
Migration has multiple implications for sending households. There are indeed many ways through which migrant's relatives are involved in both costs and bene…ts of migration. Regarding the former, migration outcomes depend on the ability to cover important transaction costs such as transport or administrative expenses. Besides, the level of education may increase the likelihood of successful integration in urban or foreign job markets. On the one hand, the parents are often the main contributors to all those expenditures.
On the other hand, they also draw several bene…ts from migration, mainly by receiving remittances. The impact of remittances is larger than a simple distribution of migrant's private gains. For instance, it is often argued that these funds allow poor households to overcome liquidity constraints (Lucas (1987) ; Stark (1991) ).
They are thereby allowed to increase initially suboptimal investments in human capital (Edwards & Ureta (2003) ; Yang (2004) ; Calero et al. (2009) ) or productive assets (Adams (1998) ). Moreover, remittances may help the recipients to cope with transitory shocks (de la Briere et al. (2002) ) or to a¤ord health care expenditure (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo (2009) ). In this perspective, it has been shown by Mendola (2008) that access to remittance ‡ows has a signi…cantly positive impact on adoption of modern but risky agricultural technologies.
Parents are therefore expected to play a crucial role in migration decisions. While, at its starting point, the economic literature on migration choices did not allow for origin household's involvement (Todaro (1969) ; Harris & Todaro (1970) ), it is now well established that a relevant representation of the decision-making process should include the parents (Stark & Levhari (1982) ; Stark (1991) ; Hoddinott (1994) ). However, the way parents' wellbeing is introduced into the analysis and the way their interaction with the prospective migrant impacts on the decision are not neutral. In particular, we argue that, due to the complexity of the parents-migrant interaction both before and after migration, a unitary model of the household is not appropriate. Moreover, we are even convinced that e¢ cient bargaining (Hoddinott (1994) ), while clearly distinguishing between parents and migrant's interests, fails to o¤er a complete understanding of parentsmigrant interaction and its outcome. In particular, it misses potential ine¢ ciencies, which, in a context of market imperfections, is problematic.
This paper develops a model of intra-household decision-making regarding investment in migration. Our aim is to show that the combination of liquidity constraints and imperfect commitment may be the source of rural households' under-investment in migration. In the second part of the paper, we provide a set of comparative statics results and compare them with comparative statics of the …rst best migration decision rule, that is what a unitary model or an e¢ cient bargaining model would have produced.
The direct impact of the migrant's liquidity constraint is mechanical and intuitive. If she is prevented from borrowing, transaction costs may not be a¤ordable even if migration generates large private returns. However, if initial household wealth allows it, parent's contribution could relax the migrant's constraint, provided this contribution is rewarded in the future, for instance through higher remittances. In this perspective, remittances can be seen as part of a long term migration contract with a loan component (Cox et al. (1998) ).
However, it can reasonably be argued that repayment of parent's contribution by the migrant is subject to ex post moral hazard. The migration decision is (most of the time) one shot and the commitment issue is therefore severe. In this paper, two alternative assumptions are nevertheless explored, either the loan is enforceable, or commitment is imperfect and it is not. The former assumption serves as a benchmark. Under the latter assumption, we need to de…ne the incentive compatible level of remittances. In other words, a motive for the migrant to remit has to be selected. Indeed, even if a loan is not per se enforceable, remittances are a widespread and huge phenomenon. Enforcement mechanisms therefore exist. Our main point is to show that, as soon as remittances are motivated by other considerations than a loan repayment, ine¢ ciencies follow. Rapoport & Docquier (2006) provide a useful overview of the di¤erent theoretical explanations behind remittance ‡ows. In addition to altruism, several sel…sh motives can be listed. A …rst motive is given by savings and investment. In the perspective of return migration, remittances are a means of transferring resources to the future. Osili (2007) provides an empirical investigation of migrants' investments in their origin country for the case of Nigeria, whereas Osili (2004) focuses more speci…cally on the bene…ts of housing investments. In those cases, the origin household acts as an agent. Exchange is a second element (Cox (1987) ). Remittances may be a form of payment for services o¤ered by the family, for instance, taking care of migrant's cattle or her household members left behind. A third explanation refers to the strategic bequest motive (Bernheim et al. (1985) ): if the parents can credibly commit to disinherit their child, they are able to attract care and transfers by designing an appropriate reward or bequest function. The heirs compete for inheritance which is larger if part of remittances is invested in the family estate. The empirical relevance of this explanation has been tested and con…rmed by Hoddinott (1994) and de la Briere et al. (2002) . Finally, farmers being confronted with important income variability, migration can serve the purpose of diversifying family income sources (Stark & Levhari (1982) ). In this perspective, remittances play the role of insurance transfers between the migrant and the parent (de la Briere et al. (2002) ). The insurance motive for remittances has desirable properties for this paper. First, mutual insurance creates an additional surplus compared to migrant's strictly private returns. This surplus that embodies the collective return to migration is a potential source of imperfect internalization since it is not entirely captured neither by the migrant, nor by the parent. Second, as we show in the following section, the insurance motive is a potential source of divergence of interest over the characteristics of migration. Interacting this feature with imperfect commitment and credit constraints allows to highlight important e¢ ciency issues.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general setting of the model and the insurance motive for remittances. Section 3 is devoted to the normative analysis of the household migration outcome.
Several assumptions are explored, from perfect capital markets to binding liquidity constraints, with and without enforceable loan. In section 4, we provide comparative statics with the aim of assessing the plausibility of the model. Section 5 concludes.
The model: mutual insurance and migration
Suppose a rural household composed of two members i 2 fp; mg, namely the parent p and the prospective migrant m. In the …rst period of the game, both players derive a risky income w r F r from farm activities.
The prospective migrant is then faced with the opportunity of internal or international migration. Migration requires that a …xed transaction cost C be spent in order to cover travel or administrative expenses, to subsist during a period of job search, etc 1 . As explained below, we allow the parent to contribute to this transaction cost thereby providing the prospective migrant with incentives to leave. Besides, migration allows to enter the urban or foreign job market and to earn its prevailing wage w u in the second period of the game. The urban income is a random variable that follows a given distribution w u F u .
As announced earlier, we are going to deal with imperfect commitment regarding reimbursement of parent's contribution. To this end, the following subsection develops a mutual insurance framework that allows to de…ne the incentive compatible value of remittances. Besides, the mutual insurance motive highlights a potential divergence of interest between the migrant and the parent over the characteristics of migration and the resulting necessity to care about internalization.
As is shown in the following subsection, the parent and the migrant can easily smooth their consumption path by pooling rural and urban risks together. We precisely de…ne migration as the possibility for a household member to change her income distribution. This event has private implications since, compared to the rural income, the urban wage follows a distribution with di¤erent characteristics in terms of mean and variance as well as collective implications since it creates an insurance surplus to be shared between both players. Risk sharing is described in the following subsection where migration is supposed to have taken place.
The mutual insurance contract, collective returns to migration
We assume that risk sharing is perfectly enforceable in the sense that the contract is not subject to the ad interim participation constraint highlighted by Coate & Ravallion (1993) . The ad interim constraint pertains to the incentive for any participant to the risk sharing arrangement to renege on the insurance agreement after having drawn a high income. The threat of exclusion has to deter deviation in the sense that the short term gains that the participant derives would she refuse to grant the insurance transfer to others have to be outweighed by the utility cost associated to the loss of access to insurance in the future. In other words, ful…lling the ad interim constraint amounts to requiring that the contract be incentive compatible. As shown by Coate & Ravallion (1993) , this requirement limits the scope for risk sharing and hence the insurance surplus. In our model, risk sharing is supposed to be e¢ cient 2 . And, even under this assumption, we highlight ine¢ ciencies in the migration decision. It follows that, if we further impose this restriction on risk sharing, potential returns to migration are a fortiori imperfectly internalized by the other household members. Put di¤erently, e¢ cient risk sharing is the best-case scenario in terms of collective returns to migration and should lead the other household members to contribute to transaction costs.
Turning to the formal setting, let y = w u + w r denote the aggregate household income after migration, with
where u and r are the expected urban and rural income, 2 u and 2 r denote their respective variances and where is correlation between urban and rural earnings. Assume the parent and the migrant have homogeneous CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) preferences and let stand for the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Also, de…new u andw r as the certainty equivalents of the urban and rural income, respectively.
Lemma 1 describes the collective returns to migration.
Lemma 1
The insurance surplus: Under CARA preferences, if two persons with given random incomes share risk e¢ ciently, then the sum of the certainty equivalents of their income after transfers does not depend 2 As appears below, e¢ cient risk sharing does not imply complete insurance, nor for the migrant, neither for the parent.
What is meant here is that the parent and the migrant cannot do better in terms of risk pooling and that the insurance surplus is maximized. As a consequence, potential ine¢ ciencies in the migration decision do not result from incomplete insurance but are caused by other factors highlighted in the paper. Proof. To begin with, notice that e¢ cient risk sharing corresponds to full income pooling. Each player earns one half of the aggregate income y. Under such a sharing rule, idiosyncratic shocks are perfectly insured and the residual income ‡uctuation is only due to covariate shocks, that is the variability of the aggregate income. In addition, let the migrant transfer a lump sum payment r to the parent. This variable determines the distribution of the surplus between both stakeholders. With this sharing rule, expected utilities are given by
where~ y=2 is the risk premium associated to the random income 
where is absolute risk aversion. Isolating the transfer r,
Equalizing the two equations and rearranging gives the expression of the aggregate certainty equivalent 3 :
which does not depend on the transfer r. Certainty equivalents are therefore transferable in this context.
Making use of (1) and (2), one can writẽ
Finally, given thatw 3 This expression can also be used to derive the Pareto frontier of this problem:
We can check that this function is indeed decreasing and concave:
we end up withỹ This means that even if incomes are perfectly correlated and unless variances are identical, there is always room for mutual insurance since the person who has the more stable income can always insure the other.
The aggregate certainty equivalent and hence the collective returns to migration are then the sum of the certainty equivalents of both rural and urban incomes and a surplus drawn from e¢ cient risk pooling. Since we know the value of the surplus that migration allows to generate (ỹ w u +w r + ), we now turn to the issue of the distribution of this surplus. In the paper, two assumptions are explored: either the parent is able to specify remittances in an enforceable migration contract, in such a case, this amount is going to determine the distribution of the migration surplus, or she is not able to do so. Under the latter assumption, we need to determine the equilibrium distribution of the gains. To this end, we adopt the Nash bargaining solution.
We argue that the Nash bargaining solution is relevant in this game, for at least two reasons. First, a "take it or leave it"set-up in which the whole surplus is captured by one player would not have appropriately translated this situation which looks like a bilateral monopoly. Indeed, on the one hand, the parent needs the migrant since only the latter can provide the former with insurance against idiosyncratic rural risks.
On the other hand, enforceable insurance contracts are the easiest to conclude within the household where information ‡ows quite e¢ ciently and where family ties can act as an enforcement device. Second, the Nash solution is consistent with the non-cooperative nature of the game. Indeed, it has been shown that the limiting outcome of strategic bargaining models (alternating o¤ers games, Rubinstein (1982) ), obtained when the length of a single o¤er period tends to zero, is precisely the Nash bargaining solution (Binmore et al. (1986) ).
The Nash bargaining program writes
where r are remittances sent by the migrant 4 . The exit options are given by the value of the urban and rural incomes if they are consumed in autarky, that is without risk sharing, by the migrant and the parent, respectively. Appendix 1 shows that, if the utility function is speci…ed as exponential CARA:
then equilibrium remittances are given by
These are the remittances that can be expected at equilibrium if any other arbitrary amount is not enforceable. As already mentioned, we are going to deal with the two alternative assumptions of enforceable vs unenforceable remittances. Equation (3) describes what is meant by unenforceable remittances. Hence, at equilibrium,
In this subsection, migration is assumed to have taken place. We are therefore dealing with a subgame of the complete setting. Within this subgame, we have derived the equilibrium distribution of returns to migration and we are now able to highlight some of its comparative statics properties. Proposition 1 introduces a preliminary result related to equilibrium remittances and highlights the possibility of diverging interests between the parent and the migrant over the characteristics of migration.
Proposition 1 Diverging interests over the characteristics of migration:
1. If remittances are sent for an insurance motive, then the parent does not care about the expected urban wage ( u ), while migrant's utility increases with u :
2. There exists a range of values for the correlation coe¢ cient such that parent's utility increases with the urban income variance 2 u while migrant's utility is decreasing in
Proof. These results are obtained by simple derivatives of equations (4) and (5) with respect to the mean u and variance 2 u of the urban income. The …rst part of Proposition 1 tells us that the expected urban wage is strictly private return for the migrant. This return is not internalized by the parent. As shown below, if the migrant su¤ers from liquidity constraints and if she cannot credibly commit to remit more than the Nash level, she might be unable to induce the parent to contribute to transaction costs. If returns to migration are essentially private, migration, while optimal, might not take place. In addition, consistently with previous theoretical …ndings (de la Briere et al. (2002)), we …nd that, if remittances are sent for an insurance purpose, they should not increase with the mean income of the migrant 5 .
The second part of Proposition 1 shows that preferences over the characteristics of migration and in particular over the urban income variance may be opposite. Parent's utility may increase with urban income variance, while the converse is true for the migrant. It follows that, between two migration opportunities, the parent might prefer to support the one in which the migrant is worse o¤ (see below). Notice that this result always holds if u is at least as large as r .
There are two channels through which urban income variability impacts on equilibrium utility levels.
There is an e¢ ciency e¤ect and a distribution e¤ect. The former stems from the impact of 2 u on the insurance surplus:
5 This prediction is in contradiction with empirical evidence of a positive link between migrant's income and remittances (Lucas & Stark (1985) ; Hoddinott (1994); Funkhouser (1995) ; Brown (1997); Sinning (2009) ). However, in reality, di¤erent motives to remit coexist in a unique decision on the amount transferred. For instance, the strategic bequest motive predicts such a relationship (de la Briere et al. (2002)) since migrant's disposable income positively impacts on her ability to compete with siblings for inheritance. Besides, remittances motivated by investment should also increase with income (Osili (2004); Osili (2007) ). Finally, altruism goes in the same direction (Lucas & Stark (1985) ).
If the correlation coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently low, a higher variability of the urban income allows to better o¤set the shocks on rural earnings. It might therefore increase the bene…ts from risk sharing for both players. The distribution e¤ect is more intuitive. An increase in urban risks deteriorates the migrant's disagreement payo¤ @wu @ 2 u < 0 , thereby improving the parent's bargaining position. If the e¢ ciency e¤ect is not large enough, the migrant is going to be worse o¤ due to a loss of bargaining power. More precisely,
With these divergences of interest, the migration decision is unlikely to result from an e¢ cient aggregation of individual preferences. From this perspective, joint utility maximization is an oversimplifying representation of the migration decision. We need to disaggregate the decision process in a non-cooperative framework. This is the standpoint adopted in this paper.
Having described the payo¤s under migration, we now introduce the complete timing of the game.
General setting
The complete timing of the game is as follows. Under unenforceable loan,
1. The parent commits to her contribution t to the migration transaction cost C.
2. The prospective migrant decides whether to migrate or not, j 2 f0; 1g. If she does, she invests the …xed transaction cost C and receives parent's contribution t.
3. If migration has been chosen in stage 2, the migrant earns the urban wage w u F u and bargains with the parent over a mutual insurance contract. The payo¤s are determined by the Nash allocation described in the preceding subsection. Otherwise, both players get the rural income.
The migration decision is one shot implying that, if remittances are unenforceable, in the sense that any arbitrary amount cannot be enforced, they should be zero would the game end at stage two. The third stage of the game is the reduced form of an in…nitely repeated mutual insurance game. Its repeated nature makes enforceable the amount of remittances corresponding to the distribution of the insurance surplus, what we have called incentive compatible remittances. In addition, it is worth noting that, since the parent is the …rst player, her promise of contribution to transaction costs is supposed to be credible. There are indeed no commitment problem at this stage since the parent transfers this amount directly in cash when travel expenditures have to be covered. On the other hand, for the same reason, the migrant cannot receive this transfer if she does not migrate.
Under the alternative assumption that a loan, and therefore any amount of remittances, is enforceable, the sequence is the following:
1. The parent designs a migration contract that speci…es her contribution t to the migration transaction cost C, on the one hand, the amount of remittances r, on the other hand.
2. The prospective migrant decides whether to migrate and accept the contract or to refuse it, j 2 f0; 1g.
If she accepts, she invests the …xed transaction cost C and receives parent's contribution t.
3. If migration has been chosen in stage 2, the migrant earns the urban wage w u F u and remits 6 r as speci…ed in the migration contract. Otherwise, both players get the rural income.
Without migration, expected utilities over the two periods of consumption write:
With migration, this gives
where is the discount factor, the interest rate, w i initial household wealth and where s ij denotes player i's savings in state of the world j, that is with or without migration. For the sake of tractability, we assume that 7 = 1 . With this assumption, optimal savings are easily derived since they simply equalize consumption between the two periods. In the developments below, if players lack access to capital markets, we assume they are prevented from borrowing. However, without migration, one can readily show that, even under borrowing constraints, optimal savings are interior (non-negative) and imply
The remaining analytical developments are organized as follows. The …rst objective is to show that, in a context of divergence of interest, internalization and hence ine¢ ciency issues result from the combination of imperfect commitment and liquidity constraints. The following section is devoted to a normative analysis aimed at highlighting these ine¢ ciencies and their source. Second, in section 4, we provide a positive analysis of the game with comparative statics with respect to household as well as migration characteristics.
A normative assessment of the migration decision rule
Five cases are successively explored: perfect capital markets; constrained migrant, unconstrained parent with and without enforceable loan and …nally, constrained migrant and parent with and without enforceable loan.
The …rst best migration decision rule is adopted by the household under the …rst two sets of assumptions, while decision-making proves ine¢ cient in the remaining cases. However, we highlight that, under perfect commitment, an intra-family loan allows to reach a second best option if both the parent and the migrant are constrained.
At this point, a caveat is important to mention. The insurance motive has been chosen to de…ne incentive compatible remittances. However, one could argue that, if capital markets allow to …nance the investment in migration and hence to smooth consumption over time, they could as well be used to absorb income shocks.
This possibility is ruled out in what follows in order to distinguish intertemporal allocation of consumption 6 In this case also, risks are e¢ ciently shared and the insurance surplus appears, see the developments below.
7 Notice that such a relationship would be the outcome of a perfect capital market in which consummers have homogeneous discount factors.
from income variability within the two periods of the game. Since perfect capital markets are unrealistic in rural developing countries settings, the …rst purpose they serve in our framework is to provide benchmark cases allowing to highlight the impact of liquidity constraints. Second, since we are solving the game backward, incentive compatible remittances are to some extent exogenous values at this stage. It follows that the payo¤s could easily be replaced by other values and, in particular, by remittances resulting from other motives, such as investment or strategic bequest.
Perfect capital markets
If the household has access to perfect capital markets, the migration decision is una¤ected by cash constraints and proves e¢ cient. This case is provided as benchmark. Since, with access to external capital, the intrafamily loan is unnecessary, remittances are replaced by their incentive compatible values.
Migrant' s decision
Incentive compatible remittances are given by equation (3). Besides, if the migrant has access to capital markets, she can smooth consumption over the two periods of time even if she migrates. Put together, Nash remittances and optimal savings, or borrowing in this case, give
De…ne m = U m1 U m0 as the utility di¤erence between migration and status quo and lett denote the level of parental contribution that leaves the migrant indi¤erent between migration and status quo. Making use of (8) and (6),
Decision to migrate is taken by m if the parent commits to any contribution t t . m opts for migration provided parental contribution …lls the gap between the present value of her private return to migration and the …xed transaction cost. The private return is composed of the certainty equivalent of the urban income and the share of the insurance surplus captured by the migrant net of the opportunity cost, that is the certainty equivalent of the agricultural income.
Parent' s decision
Similarly for the parent, Nash remittances and optimal borrowing translates in
Notice that the parent also takes a binary decision. Indeed, on the one hand, any contribution strictly lower thant is wasted since it does not lead to migration. On the other hand, the parent cannot draw additional gains by contributing above the indi¤erence threshold. It follows that the parent chooses her contribution t in 0; max 0;t . Supposet < 0. In such a case, migrant's private returns to migration are larger than the transaction cost. It is therefore optimal from the parent's point of view to free ride on the costs of migration and to bene…t from it afterwards through mutual insurance. This result holds under all the alternative assumptions studied below. If private returns are large enough, internalization is not an issue. In the relevant cases,t > 0 and the outcome of household decision-making is interesting to analyze. Supposet > 0. Then the parent chooses between paying the threshold contributiont thereby triggering o¤ migration and status quo. De…ne p = U p1 U p0 . Making use of (10) and (7),
The parent supports migration if and only if the present value of remittances outweighs the required contribution to transaction costs. Substituting for the threshold contribution (9), we obtain
Migration takes place if and only if the transaction cost is not larger than the present value of the collective returns to migration. This is the …rst best decision rule since all the costs and bene…ts are internalized. It is quite interesting to realize that even in a non-cooperative setting with unenforceable remittances, the outcome proves e¢ cient. The reason for this comes from migrant's ability to make the parent perfectly internalize his wellbeing throught. If private returns are high,t is accordingly lower. In turn, the parent takes the …nal decision by perfectly taking care of her own welfare, obviously. C can be interpreted as the household's optimal willingness to pay for migration.
Constrained migrant, unconstrained parent, enforceable loan
Given that we assume enforceable loan, the timing of the game is slightly di¤erent. As introduced above, the parent designs a complete migration contract that speci…es how costs and returns to migration are shared.
Solving backward, we begin by taking this contract as given.
Migrant' s decision
Suppose the migrant does not have access to capital markets and suppose her borrowing constraint is binding in case of migration: s m1 = 0. In this case, expected utility with migration writes
The migrant is therefore indi¤erent between migration and status quo if and only if
where m is the risk premium 8 associated to a lottery where the migrant would earn an amountw r +t C with probability 1 1+ and an amountw u + r with probability 1+ . Indeed, the sum of the weights on 8 If the migrant is in…nitely risk averse, the certainty equivalent of this lottery is the smallest amount, hence at worse the risk premium is the di¤erence between expected consumption and …rst period consumption:
At the other extreme, under risk neutrality, m = 0:
utilities on the left hand side of equation (12) is one. This expression, while similar to expected utility of a lottery with a binary outcome, represents ex ante utility derived from a distorted consumption path. Since the migrant is averse to ‡uctuations of her consumption over time, such a distortion implies a cost embodied by m . This variable captures the extent to which liquidity constraints are binding. The more consumption is distorted, that is the more …rst period consumption is reduced by the burden of the investment in migration transaction costs, the higher m . Isolatingt,
As in the previous case, the migrant has to be compensated for the gap between the transaction cost and her private return, but in addition, she needs to be compensated for the cost of a distorted consumption path stemming from liquidity constraints.
Parent' s decision
Contrary to the previous case, the parent designs a complete migration contract and, in particular, chooses the amount of remittances that maximizes her utility. Applying the implicit function theorem to (11) allows to derive migrant's reaction:
This equation describes the link between parameters (remittances and parent's contribution to transaction costs) of di¤erent migration contracts which leave the migrant indi¤erent. Since t is granted in the …rst period whereas r is transferred in the second period, it de…nes (the opposite of) migrant's marginal rate of substitution between …rst and second period consumptions. This marginal rate of substitution is lower than the discount factor as long as the migrant is cash constrained. This is intuitive since, in this case, the migrant derives a higher marginal utility from …rst period consumption. To increase both her contribution t and remittances r amounts for the parent to grant a loan contract to the migrant. As we are going to show, if the parent has access to capital markets or is wealthy enough, this allows to compensate for the migrant's lack of access.
Parent's returns to migration can by written as a function of remittances:
where the parent is assumed to be able to smooth consumption between periods and where it has been taken into account that the indi¤erence contributiont depends on remittances. The …rst order condition with respect to remittances gives
Optimal remittances for the parent are such that migrant's consumption is stable over time. In other words, the optimal migration contract, by including a loan component, acts as a substitute to the credit market.
Substituting for equilibrium remittances, (11) rewrites
Finally, parent decides to support migration if and only if the present value of remittances compensates for her contribution:
Making use of (14) and (15),
This decision rule is again e¢ cient. Hence, …rst best is reached provided the parent has interior savings and is able to enforce a loan contract thereby overcoming migrant's lack of access to credit. In this perspective, remittances act as a repayment for the initial investment made by the family on the migrant. However, unlike the mutual insurance contract in which transfers are granted on a regular basis, this loan contract is one shot and lasts a long period of time before settlement. It might therefore su¤er from a severe commitment constraint. For this reason, the following cases deal with unenforceable loan.
3.3 Constrained migrant, unconstrained parent, unenforceable loan
Migrant' s decision
If the migrant has corner savings, the expression of the threshold contributiont is the same as in the previous case, except that remittances, are replaced by their Nash (unenforceable) value (3), that is
where m is the utility loss originating from liquidity constraints.
Parent' s decision
Parent decides to support migration and to pay this threshold contribution if and only if the present value of Nash remittances is high enough:
In the case of constrained migrant and unenforceable loan, household's willingness to pay for migration is reduced. The decision rule is ine¢ cient in the sense that if C 2 (C c ; C ], then an optimal migration opportunity is not sized. This is due to the inability for the migrant to make the parent internalize her private returns to migration. This inability follows from cash constraints. On the one hand, parent's contribution is precisely needed to a¤ord transaction costs in case of shortage of liquidity. But, on the other hand, since the parent internalizes migrant's private returns throught, the migrant would even be ready to borrow in order to require from the parent a lower contribution, which she is prevented from doing.
Constrained migrant, constrained parent, unenforceable loan
According to the remark raised at the beginning of this section, this case is the most relevant. Indeed, if savings are at a corner for both the migrant and the parent, there is no bu¤er stock available in the second period to absorb income shocks. The bene…ts from mutual insurance are therefore fully relevant. In addition, this setting is the most realistic.
Migrant' s decision
Again, migrant's decision is given bỹ
Parent' s decision
If parent has corner savings, her expected utility with migration writes
Substituting for Nash remittances, parent decides to support migration if and only if
where p is the risk premium associated to a lottery where the parent would earn an amount w i +w r t with probability 1 1+ and an amountw r + 1 2 with probability 1+ . This variable embodies the utility loss due to a distorted consumption path and captures the extent to which the parent is liquidity constrained.
Substituting for parent's threshold contribution (16), we end up with
This expression represents household's willingness to pay for migration under liquidity constraints and unenforceable loan. When both the migrant and the parent have corner savings, two additional costs pertaining to the distortion of the consumption path over time appear in the decision rule. At the end of this analysis, we obtain the following relationships comparing the household's willingness to pay for migration under unenforceable loan with the …rst best willingness to pay:
This means that if the burden of the initial investment in transaction costs cannot be absorbed by borrowing or by household wealth, the willingness to pay for migration is suboptimal, put di¤erently, the decision rule is ine¢ cient. Liquidity constraints play a major role, but, as show in the following subsection, they impact could be mitigated would the loan be enforceable.
Constrained migrant, constrained parent, enforceable loan
If a loan component can be included in the migration contract, then remittances can be adjusted by the parent. The …rst order condition with respect to remittances is given by
where we have made use of equation (13) and where the c it 's denote migrant and parent's consumption levels before and after migration. The ratio of marginal utilities of the two periods of consumption belongs to the interval [0; 1] and is strictly lower than 1 as soon as the liquidity constraint is binding. The more severe the distorsion between the two consumption levels, the lower this ratio. If the parent is also constrained, she is unable to entirely absorb migrant's cash constraint and smooth her consumption over time. The optimality condition 9 (17) indicates that, in such circumstances, the level of remittances, and hence the terms of the loan contract, have to be such that the burden of the cash constraint is evenly distributed between the migrant and the parent. We can also show that this particular level of remittances maximizes the household's willingness to pay for migration for a given household wealth. By de…nition, the maximal amount of transaction cost C cc that the household can a¤ord is such that the parent is indi¤erent between migration and status quo 10 .
wheret (C cc ; r) is implicitly de…ned by equation (11). In order to maximize C cc with respect to r, we apply the implicit function theorem to the latter expression and …nd the …rst order condition:
In a situation of missing capital markets, household wealth might be too low as to …nance transaction costs while, at the same time, smoothing migrant and parent consumption paths. In such a context, we show that a loan granted by the parent to the migrant allows to reach a second best by optimally distributing the burden of the investment. However, if a loan component is unenforceable as part of the migration contract, this particular level of remittances can coincide with incentive compatible remittances only by accident.
Therefore, the household's willingness to pay for migration is systematically lower under unenforceable loan, that is when the commitment issue is properly taken into account. Notice that this argument applies to any kind of incentive to remit. In other words, if remittances are motivated by other considerations than the recovery of the family loan strictly speaking, this second best cannot be reached. Indeed, the probability that the amount remitted satis…es condition (17) tends to zero. For instance, the parent cannot make use of the bequest argument to enforce a second best migration contract since competition for bequest between siblings follows its own logic and will result in another equilibrium level of remittances.
As …nal remark, in case of liquidity constraints a¤ecting the household as a whole, the impact of imperfect commitment can be identi…ed as follows. If a loan component is assumed to be enforceable, then the migration decision is only a¤ected by the average or aggregate cash constraint of the household since individual 9 This condition ensures the tangency between the migrant and the parent indi¤erence curves in the space of the parameter of the migration contract (t; r). 1 0 Recall that the migrant is always indi¤erent since the parent is the …rst player and captures the whole surplus.
constraints can be shared. In this case, a unitary model of the household allowing for cash constraints would have produced similar predicitions. If, on the contrary, we take the more realistic case of unenforceable loan, the migration outcome depends on the household cash constraint as well as on its composition. More precisely, for a given level of household wealth, investment in migration is expected to decrease if the cash is unevenly distributed among household members.
In order to conclude this section, let us brie ‡y summarize the main results. We have seen that, as expected, perfet capital markets lead to …rst best decision-making. If capital markets are missing, …rst best can be reached under a twofold condition. On the one hand, household wealth has to be su¢ ciently large as to …nance the transaction cost while, at the same time, smoothing the household members'consumption paths over time. On the other hand, intra-household loan contracts have to be perfectly enforceable as such.
If one of those two conditions is not satis…ed, the migration decision proves ine¢ cient. Finally, for any given level of household wealth, imperfect commitment prevents the parent and migrant from sharing the burden of the investment optimally. This leads to underinvestment.
4 Comparative statics of the migration decision rule
Household characteristics
Comparative statics of household's willingness to pay for migration and hence of its likelihood to send a migrant with respect to its initial characteristics are summarized in the following propositions. Since the parameters pertain to the mutual insurance setting, we derive comparative statics of the double liquidity constraints and imperfect commitment case (C cc ) for which the insurance motive is fully relevant. The comparative statics of the …rst best decision rule are provided as benchmark.
Proposition 2 Comparative statics with respect to household wealth:
1. Household's likelihood to send a migrant increases with initial household wealth if and only if the parent has corner savings. Under CARA preferences:
2 [0; 1] is equal to 1 if parent's savings are interior.
2. The optimal migration decision rule is not a¤ ected by household wealth:
Proof. See Appendix 2.
This result is quite intuitive. An increase in household wealth allows to relax liquidity constraints. If migration was a continuous rather than a binary choice variable, dC cc dwi would be marginal propensity to invest in migration out of household wealth. This propensity belongs to the interval h 0; 1+ i and is therefore always lower than 1, meaning that a fraction of the increase in wealth is allocated to …rst period consumption. If capital markets were perfect, household wealth should not in ‡uence migration decisions.
Proposition 3 Comparative statics with respect to the mean rural income:
1. Household's likelihood to send a migrant decreases with the mean rural income. However, under liquidity constraints and unenforceable remittances, the more constrained the migrant, the lower this reduction.
Under CARA preferences, dC
where m = u 0 (wu+ 1 2 ) u 0 (wr+t C) 2 [0; 1] is strictly lower than 1 if migrant's savings are at a corner. In addition, the larger the di¤ erence between …rst and second period consumption levels, the lower m .
2. The impact of the mean rural income on optimal willingness to pay for migration is given by
The mean rural income is relevant in the migrant's decision, since it belongs to her opportunity cost, but is not relevant in the parent's decision. The migrant compares the two income distributions and is more likely to migrate, other things equal, if the rural income is low. However, migrant's wellbeing is imperfectly re ‡ected in household decision-making. As already stressed, migrant's liquidity constraints prevent the parent from internalizing properly migrant's utility. This mechanism is embodied by m < 1, which distinguishes the expression of comparative statics in the cash constraint and imperfect commitment case from its …rst best counterpart.
Proposition 4 Comparative statics with respect to the agricultural risk:
1. Under liquidity constraints and unenforceable remittances, the impact of rural income variance on household's willingness to pay for migration is given by
A su¢ cient condition for a positive e¤ ect of agricultural risk on migration is that the insurance surplus increases with the agricultural risk:
2. The impact of rural income variance on optimal willingness to pay for migration is
Let us begin by interpreting comparative statics of the …rst best decision rule, that is the second part of the proposition. E¤ects of agricultural risks on migration decisions are twofold. First, from the migrant's point of view, for a given distribution of the urban income, the higher the variance of the rural income, the higher the incentive to migrate. Due to this e¤ect, the parameter of absolute risk aversion appears in the expression in isolation from the insurance surplus . The latter is precisely the channel of the second e¤ect.
If correlation between rural and urban incomes is not too important 11 , the higher the variability of the rural income, the larger the bene…ts of mutual insurance. The …rst part of the proposition describes the impact of agricultural risks on migration under liquidity constraints and imperfect commitment. The e¤ects are similar 1 1 It can be shown that
except that the impacts on individual returns are weighted by p and m . Individual utilities are imperfectly internalized in the household decision making process. And the more her cash constraints are binding, the less an individual's wellbeing is integrated in the decision of the household 12 . It follows that liquidity constraints and internalization issues are intrinsically related to one another.
Characteristics of migration
The characteristics of the urban income distribution de…ne the migration opportunity. Their impact on the decision rule are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 5 Comparative statics with respect to the mean urban income:
1. Household's likelihood to send a migrant increases with the mean urban income. However, under liquidity constraints and unenforceable remittances, this e¤ ect is a decreasing function of migrant's liquidity constraints. Under CARA preferences, dC
2. The impact of the mean urban income on optimal willingness to pay for migration is given by
The mean urban income is part of migrant's private returns. The higher the urban wage, other things equal, the higher the incentive to migrate. However, household decision-making is less sensitive to migrant's private returns if migrant's incentives to migrate are impeded by liquidity constraints.
Proposition 6 Comparative statics with respect to the urban income variance:
1. Under liquidity constraints and unenforceable remittances, the impact of urban income variance on household's willingness to pay for migration is given by
2. The impact of urban income variance on optimal willingness to pay for migration is
3. There exist cases in which household's willingness to pay for migration increases while the aggregate returns decrease:
1 2 This model is a principal-agent model. The parent is the …rst player and always chooses a contribution such that the migrant is indi¤erent between migration and status quo. Therefore, technically, he entirely reaps the collective and private returns to migration. Hence, when we say that household decision imperfectly internalizes each member's wellbeing, we speak about the composition of the surplus not about its distribution.
Again, the urban income variance impacts on migrant's private returns as well as on collective returns through the insurance surplus. On the one hand, the higher the urban risk, the lower the private returns.
On the other hand, if correlation between rural and urban earnings is high enough 13 , the urban risk might also be detrimental to the insurance surplus. However, in the opposite case @ @ 2 u > 0 and depending on the respective internalization weighs, p and m , it is possible to have cases in which the likelihood of migration increases with the urban income variance, while, at the same time, the migrant is worse o¤ and the collective returns are lower. This result relies on two elements. First, if the impact of urban risk on the insurance surplus is positive but low in magnitude, the migrant might be worse o¤ since this e¤ect does not outweighs the negative impact on her private return. Hence, utilities derived from migration may evolve in opposite directions between the migrant and the parent. If one adds severe cash constraints for the migrant, the internalization of her wellbeing in household decision-making ( m ) might be low enough compared to p to produce the above-mentionned result.
Proposition 7 Comparative statics with respect to correlation between rural and urban earnings:
1. Under liquidity constraints and unenforceable remittances, the impact of correlation between rural and urban earnings on household's willingness to pay for migration is given by
2. The impact of correlation between rural and urban earnings on optimal willingness to pay for migration
Since correlation only matters for mutual insurance, the parent and the migrant are symmetrically a¤ected by it. The impact is intuitive, if correlation increases, the desirability of migration for insurance purposes is reduced.
Concluding remarks
As widely acknowledged, returns to migration go beyond migrant's earnings. The bene…ts drawn by sending households take multiple forms, such as a reduction of land pressure, advantages in terms of information about urban or foreign job opportunities, accommodation facilities for schoolchildren, etc. However, among those bene…ts, remittances are maybe the most important channel through which the sending household shares in the bene…ts from migration. In this paper, the collective returns to migration are modelled as bene…ts from mutual insurance. The insurance surplus is created by pooling rural and urban risks together and is therefore, as the examples mentioned above, distinct from migrant's purely private returns. Moreover, we have shown that the mutual insurance motive may generate divergence of interest between the migrant and the parent over the characteristics of migration, namely the risk associated to the migration income. With this distinction between private and collective gains and with this possibility of divergence of interest, household
decision-making cannot prove e¢ cient unless individual gains are properly internalized. While joint utility maximization or e¢ cient bargaining (Hoddinott (1994) ) assume internalization, a non-cooperative approach allows to assess it.
We have presented a model of migration choice under liquidity constraints and imperfect commitment in order to highlight the sources of imperfect internalization. The way we model intra-household decision to invest in migration seems plausible since our comparative statics results are consistent with previous work on migration and remittances. First, migration is positively related to household wealth (Hoddinott (1994) ).
Notice that this is not the outcome of the strategic bequest motive, rather, our explanation stems from the fact that household wealth relaxes liquidity constraints. Second, plausibility checks of the model are also
given by the following results. From a strictly individual point of view, the propensity to migrate is shown to depend on the expected wage gap between rural and urban earnings (Todaro (1969) ; Larson & Mundlak (1997) ) and is also shown to be higher if it allows a reduction of personal risks (Stark & Levhari (1982) ).
Turning to normative issues that are more central in the paper, we highlight that internalization problems potentially go in both directions: on the one hand, the migrant has to take account of the whole collective returns, on the other hand, the parent has to allow for migrant's private returns. In our model, instruments of internalization exist. Indeed, on the one hand, our setting takes account of the important migration transaction costs and allows the parent to contribute to it. On the other hand, the migrant sends remittances that could serve as a reward for parent's contribution. However, those instruments are potentially impeded by the combination of individual liquidity constraints and imperfect commitment. As far as the former is concerned, could the migrant credibly commit to remit more, she would be able to induce the parent to contribute more, thereby relaxing her liquidity constraint. We have shown that …rst best can be reached if the parent has interior savings and is able to enforce a migration contract with a loan component. Regarding parent's liquidity constraints, if savings are at a corner, that is if household wealth does not allow to support the burden of the investment, then the migrant imperfectly internalizes parent's returns. It follows that conditions for e¢ ciency are twofold, important household wealth and enforceable loan. As intuition suggests, those conditions are unlikely to be simultaneously ful…lled in developing countries. In most cases, household's willingness to pay for migration therefore appears to be ine¢ ciently low. In a policy perspective, one could therefore expect that programs promotting access to capital in rural areas may have as side e¤ect an increase in rural-urban or even international migration ‡ows.
Finally, the outcome of our model can be related to the broad theoretical and empirical literature on household decision. As widely acknowledged, for a given aggregate household income, the pattern of expenditures is signi…cantly in ‡uenced by each spouse's earning power 14 . It follows that, each household member's wellbeing is re ‡ected in household decision-making 15 according to her relative income. This paper translates this result, pertaining to consumption, in the case of an investment decision under imperfect capital markets. Migration is indeed an investment subject to cash constraints 16 . In the migration story, we have shown 1 4 This is documented empirically (Browning et al. (1994); Woolley (2003) ; Du ‡o & Udry (2003)). From a theoretical point of view, this fact is predicted by Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) (p. 878) in her model about the interactions between labor and marriage markets. This prediction of a link between the expenditure pattern and individual incomes can also be found in Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992) 's collective setting or in its interesting extension by Basu (2006 
wheret is implicitly de…ned by
if migrant's savings are at a corner. Now, taking any parameter and applying the implicit function theorem to (18), we have that dC
where
The impact of a given parameter on the migration outcome results from the aggregation of its impact on parent's willingness to contribute p and its impact on migrant's private returns throught. In addition, we now that @ p @t = @ p @C = u 0 w i +w r t ; since @t @C = 1:
Equation ( The point is that m , the risk premium, is equal to the precautionary premium in case of exponential CARA preferences. The de…nition of the precautionary premium (Kimball (1990) ), here denoted by is given by the following relationship where Y is a random variable:
Kimball ( where u 000 u 00 is the coe¢ cient of absolute prudence as de…ned by Kimball (1990) . The …nal step is given by the fact that absolute prudence and absolute risk aversion are equal under CARA preferences (Kimball (1990) , p.65).
First best decision rule
The comparative statics of the optimal willingness to pay for migration are readily given by the derivative of C = (w u + w r ) ; where = 4 2 r + 2 u 2 r u , with respect to the relevant parameter.
Proof of Proposition 2: household wealth w i
Two elements are needed in order to use equation (20) 
Finally, combining equations (20), (22) and (24) . The former is zero sincew u does not appear in p .
The latter is directly derived from the application of the implicit function theorem to (19). This gives
7.6 Proof of Proposition 6: urban income variance 2 u
The proof of the …rst part of Proposition 6 is as follows. On the one hand, 
